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Angela Huyue Zhang* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the media, a neglected but important 
institution that plays a role in influencing Chinese antitrust 
enforcement. Drawing from the methodology used in communication 
studies, the Article conducted a content analysis of 1,394 news 
reports on six high-profile Chinese antitrust investigations from 2008 
to 2015. The findings demonstrate that in reporting antitrust 
investigations, Chinese media tends to be biased against firms under 
investigation. Instead of providing a balanced and objective account 
of the story, the media was an effective conduit for amplifying the 
populist concern, and aided and abetted the regulator in advancing 
its enforcement. The Article argues that such an outcome is driven by 
at least three factors: the regulator’s strategic leakage of information 
to state-controlled media, the rarity of public dissents of agency 
decisions, and the populist pressures for lower prices and 
nationalism. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
China is the second-largest economy in the world. However, it 
was not until 2007 that it passed the Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”), 
its first modern antitrust legislation. Since the AML went into effect 
in 2008, antitrust investigations have made constant headlines in 
China. In 2009, Coca-Cola’s bid for Huiyuan, a domestic juice 
manufacturer, generated a fierce debate among the Chinese public 
about whether a famous domestic brand should be swallowed by a 
large foreign multinational.1 The deal was ultimately blocked by the 
Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”), causing a stir in the business 
and legal communities 2  In 2011, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (the “NDRC”) made a surprise announcement of 
its investigation into China Telecom and China Unicom on the China 
Central Television (“CCTV”). 3 This unusual move led to a public 
row among several state-controlled media outlets and ignited a heated 
debate about antitrust regulation of state-owned enterprises 
                                                                                                             
1. See infra Section VI.B.  
2. David Barboza, China Blocks Coke Bid for Juice Maker, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 18, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/business/worldbusiness/19coke.html [https://perm
a.cc/Z8QG-ATRG] (archived on Jan. 3, 2018). 
3. See infra Section IV.A. 
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(“SOEs”). 4  In less than two months, China Telecom and China 
Unicom relented and offered remedies and requested that the 
investigation be suspended.5 Two years later, the NDRC applied the 
same tactic by publicly announcing its investigation into nine infant 
formula manufacturers on the CCTV.6 Before the agency formally 
imposed any legal sanction, infant formula producers had already 
started announcing significant price reductions of their products. 7 
These episodes suggest that the media may play a role in influencing 
antitrust enforcement in China. What are the mechanisms through 
which the media can potentially influence public enforcement of the 
AML? Is there a bias in the media’s coverage of antitrust 
investigations in China? What are the factors driving the supply and 
demand of media content? 
Chinese antitrust enforcement presents an excellent setting for 
examining the role of the media in law enforcement. First, Chinese 
antitrust cases are often very visible—this is due not only to the 
prominence of the targets involved, but also to the fact that many of 
the cases involve daily consumer products or services. The media has 
an interest in covering these cases, as they directly concern consumer 
prices and relate to the welfare of the general public. Second, China 
only started to enforce its AML eight years ago, so the media has not 
yet established a long track record of imposing reputational penalties 
on firms subject to antitrust investigations. Otherwise, firms would 
not commit such violations in the first place or would quickly yield to 
the agency’s demands to avoid negative publicity. As such, the early 
years of the enforcement of the AML provide us with a unique 
opportunity to observe a transient stage when the authority of the 
antitrust enforcement agency has not been well-established. Third, 
China lacks the western-style of legal governance, with an 
independent court providing effective checks on administrative 
abuse.8 Despite hectic enforcement by Chinese antitrust agencies and 
mounting complaints lodged by foreign businesses with their 
chambers of commerce, there have thus far been few challenges to 
                                                                                                             
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. See infra Section IV.B. 
7. Id. 
8. Angela Huyue Zhang, Bureaucratic Politics and China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 671, 677-80 (2014). 
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public antitrust enforcement.9 As a consequence, the power to enforce 
the law is monopolized by the government, which leaves much room 
for other non-competition factors to influence its enforcement agenda 
and outcomes. 
Using media content analysis,10 I conducted a close examination 
of 1,394 news reports on six Chinese high-profile antitrust 
investigations from 2008 to 2015. I have several major findings. First, 
in two cases, Chinese antitrust regulators strategically leaked 
information about their investigations to the CCTV. Such leaking 
helped the agency obtain the first mover advantage to shape the 
editorial slant and leverage the public opinion to push forward its 
investigation. Although on one occasion, two powerful SOEs 
launched a media campaign to defend themselves, there was no 
countervailing effort from other private domestic or foreign firms. 
Second, due to the lack of judicial checks on agency discretion, there 
is little market demand for expert criticisms of agency decisions. As 
such, domestic antitrust experts are disincentivized to voice dissent, 
                                                                                                             
9. Indeed, foreign multinational companies have voiced mounting complaints against 
Chinese antitrust authorities for deficiencies in transparency and due process. In a survey 
conducted by the US-China Business Council in 2014, over eighty six percent of the surveyed 
companies indicated that they were “somewhat” or “very” concerned about the AML 
enforcement, citing issues such as discrimination, lack of due process and regulatory 
transparency, and use of noncompetition factors as major concerns. The reports released by 
the Chambers of Commerce in both the United States and Europe also contained scathing 
criticisms of China’s hectic antitrust enforcement in recent years. See US-China Business 
Council, USCBC 2014 CHINA BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SURVEY RESULTS: GROWTH 
CONTINUES AMIDST RISING, 20 (2014), https://www.uschina.org/reports/uscbc-2014-china-
business-environment-survey-results [https://perma.cc/37ZY-KDB3] (last visited Jan. 3, 
2018); US CHAMBER OF COMM., COMPETING INTERESTS IN CHINA’S COMPETITION LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW APPLICATION AND THE ROLE OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 77-78 (2014), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/aml_final_
090814_final_locked.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9TH-NDX8 (last visited Jan. 3, 2018] (The US 
Chamber of Commerce accused the Chinese government of using the AML to advance 
industrial policy goals at the expense of free competition, curtailing intellectual property 
protection of foreign firms, and enforcing the AML without an adequate due process 
safeguard.); see also European Chamber of Commerce, European Chamber Releases 
Statement On China AML-Related Investigations (August 13, 2014), http://www.european
chamber.com.cn/en/press-releases/2132/european_chamber_releases_statement_on_china_am
l_related_investigations [https://perma.cc/6WZR-LEXT] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018) ( “It [The 
Commerce] had received numerous alarming anecdotal accounts from a number of sectors that 
administrative intimidation tactics are being used to impel companies to accept punishments 
and remedies without full hearings. Practices such as informing companies not to challenge the 
investigations, bring lawyers to the hearings or involve their respective governments or 
chambers of commerce are contrary to best practices.”). 
10. KIMBERLY A. NEUENDORF, THE CONTENT ANALYSIS GUIDEBOOK (2d ed. 2017). 
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which dampens the frequency of public criticism of antitrust 
intervention. Third, the Chinese media as a whole shows little interest 
in understanding the legal merits of antitrust cases and the media 
coverage caters to the populist demands for lower prices and 
nationalist concerns. Thus, the Chinese media lacks the incentive to 
expose criticisms over regulatory intervention and the editorial slant 
tends to spin in the direction that is damaging to the company under 
investigation. The media becomes a conduit for amplifying the 
populist concern, aiding and abetting the regulator in advancing its 
enforcement. 
This Article contributes to several strands of literature. First, in a 
series of papers, Dyck, Zingales, and their coauthors conducted the 
seminal work of exploring the role of media in corporate 
governance.11 Using evidence from Russia, another country beset by 
weak legal institutions, they found that foreign media coverage could 
be strategically employed to discipline corporate governance 
violations of firms.12 This Article examines the role of the media in 
another area of law enforcement and another jurisdiction. In contrast 
to Dyck’s findings that domestic media did not have an impact on 
corporate governance in Russia, this Article identifies some 
preliminary evidence suggesting that domestic media in China can be 
a powerful influence upon enforcement outcomes in Chinese antitrust 
law. 
Second, this Article contributes to the study of the relationship 
between competition and truth in the news market. As with any other 
product on the market, the quantity and the quality of the information 
produced by the media depends on both supply and demand. Thus far, 
economic literature has found that competition is effective in 
eliminating media bias from the supply side, but the evidence of the 
media bias driven by consumer demand is inconclusive. 13 
Mullainathan and Shleifer argued that competition does not enhance 
accuracy, as long as consumers would rather read less accurate news 
                                                                                                             
11. ALEXANDER DYCK & LUIGI ZINGALES, The Bubble and the Media, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Peter K. Cornelius & Bruce 
Kogut eds., 2002); Alexander Dyck et al., The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: 
Evidence from Russia, 63 J. FIN. 1093 (2008); Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle 
on Corporate Fraud, 65 J. FIN. 2213 (2010). 
12. Dyck et al., supra note 11. 
13. See Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Competition and Truth in the Market 
for News, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE 133, 114-15 (2008) (giving a comprehensive review of the 
literature). 
478 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:473 
than have their personal beliefs challenged.14 Gentzkow and Shapiro 
reached the opposite conclusion in their paper, but their conclusion 
was drawn upon a different assumption that readers’ confirmatory 
preferences are driven by a desire for accuracy. 15 The media bias 
identified in this Article seems to confirm the insights of 
Mullainathan and Shleifer. As illustrated in the studies of cases 
involving resale price maintenance (“RPM") practices, the 
competition among commercialized media outlets in China did not 
improve accuracy in reporting; rather, it appears to worsen the biases 
in many instances. 
Third, this Article also relates to a strand of literature on 
empirical studies on media bias in China. Until now, most empirical 
studies of media bias have been staged in settings with strong 
democratic characteristics, and empirical studies on the role of the 
media in authoritarian regimes remain a nascent field. One study finds 
that the surge of commercial newspapers in China can reduce readers’ 
exposure to highly biased newspapers but does not diminish the 
political bias within the same newspapers. 16  Another recent study 
identifies evidence suggesting that commercialization allows Chinese 
newspapers to attenuate political influences and cater better to the 
preferences of consumers.17 In a departure from these studies, this 
research explores media bias in covering corporate misconduct, a 
topic that is generally deemed non-sensitive and is not subject to tight 
political control. This Article thus attempts to fill in a gap in the 
literature in understanding how Chinese media uncovers non-
politically sensitive commercial news. 
Fourth, the Article contributes to the study of the media’s role in 
the Chinese legal system. Liebman pioneered the study in examining 
the dual role that the media has played in influencing judicial 
decisions: on the one hand, extensive media coverage of a case can 
                                                                                                             
14. See generally Sendhill Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, The Market for News, 95 
AM. ECON. REV. 1031 (2005). 
15. See generally Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Media Bias and Reputation, 
114 J. POL. ECON. 280 (2006). 
16 . Bei Qin et al., Media Bias in Autocracies: Evidence from China (Sept. 2014), 
http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~yanhuiwu/MediaBias1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BM8-AVX4] (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2018). 
17. Joseph D. Piotroski et al., Political Bias of Corporate News in China: Role of 
Commercialization and Conglomeration Reforms, (May 2016) (unpublished research paper, 
Stanford University Graduate School of Business), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2674780 [https://
perma.cc/GW3D-MZR9] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018). 
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pressure courts to act more carefully and fairly, but on the contrary, it 
could also encourage more political intervention in the courtroom, 
predetermine the outcomes of cases, and strengthen the Chinese 
Communist Party (the Party)’s control over the court.18 This Article 
focuses on a different aspect of the legal system and examines how 
media coverage influences public enforcement of administrative law. 
As illustrated by the case studies below, rather than injecting more 
checks and balances into the legal system, extensive media coverage 
of an antitrust investigation could exacerbate the biases against 
investigated firms. This is consistent with the findings by Stockman 
and Gallagher in their study of labor law related disputes in China, 
where the authors found that the media content hewed closely to the 
Party line.19 
Finally, this Article contributes to the institutionally-oriented 
research on antitrust law. Antitrust law made significant strides in the 
20th century by incorporating more economic insights into its analysis. 
While the criteria in legal analysis have become more objective, the 
power to enforce the law lies with the institutional actors. In an ideal 
setting, antitrust regulators should set their enforcement agenda 
independently, enforce the law non-discriminatorily, and observe due 
process requirements, whereas an independent judiciary should 
provide an effective check on administrative discretion and agency 
abuse. 20  China’s experience with antitrust enforcement reveals the 
potential risks in adopting an antitrust law without such institutional 
safeguards. The effects of the media in influencing antitrust 
investigation is another example of how extralegal factors could 
affect the enforcement outcomes of the AML in China. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part II sets the stage by 
introducing the institutional background of the Chinese newspaper 
industry and the mechanisms through which the media can influence 
public enforcement of the AML. Part III describes the methodology 
and data used in analyzing the cases. Part IV uses two high-profile 
antitrust investigations to illustrate how the NDRC strategically 
manipulated the supply of media content and successfully mobilized 
                                                                                                             
18. BENJAMIN L. LIEBMAN, Changing Media, Changing Courts, in CHANGING MEDIA, 
CHANGING CHINA 151 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011). 
19. Daniela Stockmann & Mary E. Gallagher, Remote Control: How the Media Sustain 
Authoritarian Rule in China, 44 COMP. POL. STUD. 1, 23 (2011). 
20. William E. Kovacic, Getting Started:  Creating New Competition Policy Institutions 
in Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 403, 409-13(1997). 
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public sentiment to push forward its investigations. Part V analyzes 
the disincentives among Chinese antitrust lawyers and academics to 
voice criticisms over antitrust intervention. In particular, it performs a 
content study of the incident involving the dismissal of Zhang 
Xinzhu, a renowned antitrust expert, from a government advisory 
committee. Part VI turns to the demand side bias and analyzes how 
populist concerns could drive media coverage of antitrust 
investigations. It studies the editorial slant in three RPM 
investigations and a merger review involving Coca-Cola’s attempted 
acquisition of a well-known domestic brand. Part VII concludes. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The Chinese media was once called “the mouth and tongue” of 
the party.21 Liebman observes that the industry is subject to regulation 
by a complicated “web of formal and informal regulation.”22 In 2016, 
Reporters Without Borders ranked China 176th out of 180 countries in 
its index of press freedom.23 The Freedom House called China “one 
of the world’s most restrictive media environments” and gave it a 
press freedom score of 87 out of 100 (with 100 being the worst) in 
2016.24 Meanwhile, China also has one of the world’s most dynamic 
media markets, and its advertising expenditure ranked only after the 
United States in 2015.25 
Chinese media went through significant transformations in 
several rounds of reform. The first reform carried out in the 1990s led 
to the commercialization of many newspapers that focus on reporting 
financial and economic news.26 Unlike party newspapers, which are 
still tightly controlled by the local communist party organization and 
propaganda departments, many commercial newspapers have become 
                                                                                                             
21. Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese System, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 (2005); SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER 85 (2007). 
22. Liebman, supra note 21, at 41. 
23 REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, 2016 WORLD PRESS FREEDOM INDEX,, 
https://rsf.org/en/ranking [https://perma.cc/VGB9-MA38] (last visited Nov. 1, 2017). 
24. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2016, FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG, https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/china [https://perma.cc/VVT3-QZQ8] (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2018). 
25. STATISTA, ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE IN THE WORLD’S LARGEST AD MARKETS IN 
2015 (IN BILLION U.S. DOLLARS), STATISTA.COM, http://www.statista.com/statistics/
273736/advertising-expenditure-in-the-worlds-largest-ad-markets/ [https://perma.cc/9FWL-HL
B2] (last visited Jan 4., 2018]. 
26. Piotroski et al., supra note 17. 
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self-sufficient and no longer rely on financial support from the 
government. 27  The other large-scale reforms involved the 
conglomeration of selected newspapers into newly created media 
groups. 28  Although commercialized newspapers are still subject to 
political control by the Chinese government, they are financially 
driven and compete for audiences by appealing to their tastes and 
demands.29 
Generally speaking, Chinese newspapers are divided into three 
categories: official newspapers, semi-official newspapers, and 
commercialized newspapers. 30  Official newspapers receive indirect 
subsidiaries through subscription by government units.31 In contrast, 
semiofficial and commercialized newspapers are completely financed 
through advertising, with the latter partially privatized, while the 
former is not.32 All newspapers continue to be registered under state 
organization and are subject to close state scrutiny. 33  Editors and 
journalists generally perceive the official papers as experts on the 
position of the government while unofficial papers voice public 
opinion.34 Nonofficial media thus have more credibility, and this in 
turn improves their ability to influence public opinion.35 At the same 
time, the commercialization of the media and the emergence of the 
internet has revolutionized the way that the Chinese Communist Party 
leadership and the citizens interact during the public policy making 
process.36 As the internet becomes an important platform for Chinese 
citizens to voice grievances and participate in public affairs, the 
Chinese government is learning to be more responsive and adaptive in 
the digital environment.37 
                                                                                                             
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 3. 
29. Id. 
30. DANIELA STOCKMANN, MEDIA COMMERCIALIZATION AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE 
IN CHINA 67-68 (2013). 
31. See DANIELA STOCKMANN, What Kind of Information Does the Public Demand? 
Getting the News during the 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests, in CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING 
CHINA 179 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011). 
32. Id. 
33. Stockmann & Gallagher, supra note 19, at 6. 
34. STOCKMANN, supra note 31, at 180. 
35. Id. at 181-82. 
36 . See generally Xiao Qiang, The Rise of Online Public Opinion and Its Political 
Impact, in CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA, 203 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011). 
37. Id. at 222-23. 
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There are several mechanisms through which the media can 
influence Chinese antitrust enforcement. First, economists have 
argued that profit-maximizing media can help overcome the rational 
ignorance problem of voters. 38  By collecting, verifying, and 
summarizing relevant facts, the media mitigates the collective action 
problem associated with gathering information for a dispersed 
group.39 Many Chinese SOEs hold entrenched and vested interests in 
concentrated industry sectors in China.40 Meanwhile, these SOEs also 
enjoy superior bureaucratic and political status, and they have more 
convenient channels through which to lobby, making it more difficult 
and costly for antitrust agencies to bring actions against them. 41 
However, the media can help inform the public about antitrust policy, 
empowering the policy entrepreneurs to mobilize public sentiment in 
order to challenge such concentrated interests.42 As illustrated in Part 
IV regarding the NDRC’s media campaign, news coverage of Chinese 
antitrust enforcement was driven not only by the intrinsic appeal of 
each piece of news, but also by the efforts exerted by the regulator. 
Second, if a Chinese state-controlled media strongly endorses an 
antitrust intervention, this sends a political signal that the 
administrative intervention has gained endorsement from higher 
levels of the government. It also causes speculation that the Chinese 
government is tightening its regulation of an industry, with antitrust 
intervention being one of its tools to achieve its policy objectives, as 
illustrated in the Infant Formula Case elaborated in Section IV.B. 
below. Thus, if a firm vigorously defends itself, it might not only be 
viewed as defying the antitrust agency, but might also provoke the 
Chinese government for thwarting its policy objectives. This fear of 
provocation, coupled with the weak legal institutions and the lack of 
judicial oversight over agency action, exerts pressures on firms to 
conform to the antitrust agency’s demand. 
Third, Chinese media not only plays the role as a party 
mouthpiece but is also an information gatherer and watchdog for the 
Party. 43 Political scientists have long identified the function of the 
                                                                                                             
38. Alexander Dyck et al., Media versus Special Interest, 56 J. L. ECON. 521 (2013). 
39. Id. 
40. Angela Huyue Zhang, Taming the Chinese Leviathan, Is Antitrust Regulation A 
False Hope, 51 STAN. J. INT’L L. 195, 207-11 (2015). 
41. Id. 
42. See Dyck et al, supra note 38. 
43. YUEZHI ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA: BETWEEN THE PARTY 
LINE AND THE BOTTOM LINE (1998). 
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Chinese media as a bottom-up information transmission system, 
which helps the party leaders gather intelligence and monitor the 
performance of lower-level government officials.44 Moreover, as the 
actions of the Chinese antitrust agencies are seldom tested in court, 
popular support is an important means through which Chinese 
enforcement agencies can obtain legitimacy for their actions. The 
endorsement from the public helps the agency gain political credit 
from within the bureaucracy. It also helps the agency overcome the 
political opposition that it faces when tackling large SOEs, as 
illustrated in the China Telecom Case in Section IV.A. below. 
Fourth, consumer product firms operating in China are sensitive 
to the negative publicity brought by antitrust investigations. As 
suggested by Dyck and Zingales, the effectiveness of the media 
depends on two essential characteristics of the institutional 
environment. First, public shaming works when society as a whole 
takes a negative view of the conduct exposed by the press.45 Second, 
the magnitude of the penalty depends on the frequency and 
importance of business’ interactions with the consumers, the capital 
market, and the government. 46 The Chinese market has long been 
plagued by concerns about poor quality and counterfeits. A good 
reputation is therefore expensive to establish in China. An antitrust 
investigation of a firm could tarnish the brand image that these firms 
have worked hard to cultivate, leaving consumers with the impression 
that they have been “ripped off.” Thus, Chinese consumer product 
firms will most likely suffer as a result of the negative publicity after 
the exposure of their involvement in an antitrust investigation. 
Ironically, the less market power that a firm has, the more that it fears 
the damage to its reputation because consumers can easily turn to 
other brands as substitutes. This is particularly the case for companies 
involved in RPM investigation. The vast majority of these cases that 
the NDRC has investigated so far involve consumer product firms 
operating in highly competitive markets. These companies are 
therefore the most vulnerable to negative publicity brought by media 
coverage of their cases, as illustrated in Section VI.A. below. 
                                                                                                             
44. Id. 
45. DYCK et al., supra note 11, at 1101. 
46. Id. at 1102. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
In order to examine the role of the media and its effects on 
antitrust enforcement, I collected all the investigations that were 
conducted by the Chinese antitrust agencies from the inception of the 
AML to the end of 2015.47 I include only closed cases and those in 
which there were public disclosures of the NDRC’s investigations, as 
sometimes the agency did not make any disclosure of its investigation 
or decision.48 I then used WiseNews to search for the relevant news 
reports covering these cases between the first public disclosure of the 
case and the date before the agency released its decision.49 WiseNews 
collects news reports from a wide range of general interest Chinese 
newspapers published in mainland China.50 Within the relevant search 
period, I found six that attracted over 100 media reports on 
WiseNews. These include the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Case, the China 
Telecom/China Unicom, the White Liquor Case, the Infant Formula 
Case, the Auto Part Case, and the Qualcomm case. A summary of 
each of these cases is provided in Annex I. Among these six cases, 
one is a merger case, two are abuse of dominance cases, and three 
involve RPM. With the exception of the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Case, all 
five other cases were investigated by the NDRC. As Qualcomm is not 
a consumer product firm and does not directly interact with end 
consumers, I expected that the firm would be less sensitive to media 
coverage. Thus, in the Qualcomm case, I did not study the whole 
period of the media coverage, but rather the pertinent period 
involving the dismissal of Zhang Xinzhu, an eminent antitrust expert 
from a government advisory committee. 
I then performed content analysis of the relevant news articles in 
the sample.51 I included only those articles that focus on discussing 
                                                                                                             
47 . I rely on the information disclosed on the websites of the three main Chinese 
antitrust enforcement agencies to collect the information about the investigations. It should be 
noted, however, sometimes the Chinese agencies did not publicize some of their investigations 
so there is no public record of these cases. 
48. Angela Huyue Zhang, Strategic Public Shaming: Evidence from Chinese Antitrust, 
CHINA QUARTERLY (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2943268 [https://perma.cc/W9PW-4S45] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).  
49. For all these searches, I limited my search on news articles published by media 
outlets in mainland China. 
50. WiseNews’ database is http://wisenews.wisers.net/wisenews/index.do? [https://perm
a.cc/E7FL-PAN8 ] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). 
51. In the Qualcomm case, as the inquiry is about dismissal of Zhang Xinzhu, I focus on 
the media coverage between the first public disclosure of the dismissal of Zhang to the date 
before the release of the Qualcomm decision. 
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the investigations, excluding those that made only passing reference 
to these cases. A summary statistics of the number of relevant articles 
and the number of media outlets of these four cases are presented in 
Table 1 below. 
 
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF ARTICLES AND MEDIA OUTLETS 
IN WISENEWS  
 
Case 
Articles 
(N) 
Media 
Outlets (N) Search Window 
Coca-Cola 272 158 
Sep. 3, 2008 to March 17, 
2009 
China 
Telecom/China 
Unicom 
202 75 9 Nov. 2011 to 1 Dec. 2011 
White Liquor 101 48 
Jan. 15, 2013 to Feb. 18, 
2013 
Infant Formula 502 91 
June 27, 2013 to August 6, 
2013 
Auto Part 257 74 
July 26, 2014 to August 12, 
2014 
Qualcomm  
(the Zhang 
Xinzhu incident) 
60 44 
August 12, 2014 to Feb. 9, 
2015 
Total 1394 n/a n/a 
 
I read through each article, which allowed me to reconstruct the 
details of how the NDRC strategically leaked the existence of its 
investigation to state-controlled media, how the public reacted to such 
disclosure, how the media covered the investigation, whether it 
interviewed any industry or legal experts, and how the experts 
commented on the case, as well as the subsequent responses from the 
investigated firms, the regulator, and other media outlets. I used a 
mixture of inductive and deductive coding, beginning with themes 
that I expected to be reported based on my previous reading of the 
news coverage on these antitrust investigations, but I also added new 
codes as they emerged from the media analysis. I then documented 
the major theme of each article, how the news was framed, the origin 
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and the institutional affiliations of the sources cited in the article, how 
the sources commented on the investigation, and the general tone of 
the article. 
IV. THE NDRC’S MEDIA CAMPAIGN 
China currently has three main antitrust enforcement agencies. 
The NDRC and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(“SAIC”) are jointly responsible for the enforcement against 
anticompetitive conducts, whereas MOFCOM is responsible for 
merger control. In recent years, the NDRC has emerged as a more 
powerful regulator and its hectic enforcement actions have dwarfed 
SAIC. As of the end of 2016, the antitrust bureau within the NDRC, 
formally titled the Anti-Monopoly and Price Supervision Bureau, had 
launched investigations against many prominent targets, including 
national state-owned giants such as China Telecom and China 
Unicom, local state-owned champions such as Maotai and Wuliangye, 
and leading multinational companies in a wide range of industries 
ranging from infant formula to auto manufacturers to chip makers. At 
the same time, the SAIC’s enforcement activities did not attract much 
public attention, with the exception of its investigations into 
Microsoft and Tetra Pack. 
Notably, the NDRC is the only one among the three enforcement 
agencies that has been seen to actively and consciously utilize a 
media strategy during antitrust enforcement actions. During the tenure 
of Xu Kunlin, the NDRC officials appeared twice on Dialogue, a 
CCTV talk show, to publicize their enforcement activities. On August 
25, 2013, Xu appeared on Dialogue to discuss his agency’s 
experience in investigating three high-profile cases including the 
Infant Formula, the Gold Retailer, and White Liquor Cases. 52 The 
audience in the show all appeared to be officials from the antitrust 
unit. 53  An executive from Wyeth, an infant formula producer 
investigated in 2013, also appeared on the show to publicly announce 
its determination to reduce prices in conformity with the NDRC’s 
request. 54  Wyeth’s proactive cooperation ultimately won it full 
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immunity from fines. 55  On February 15, 2015, Xu and his team 
appeared on the Dialogue show again, highlighting the challenges that 
the NDRC received in response to the Qualcomm investigation.56 Xu 
first tried to rebut the challenges from foreign media sources, arguing 
that it had not discriminated against foreign multinational companies 
during its antitrust enforcement. 57  He also firmly denied the 
allegations of due process violations during antitrust investigations.58 
TV appearances such as these not only serve to raise public awareness 
of the AML, but also help the NDRC establish its legal authority and 
legitimacy. In addition to TV interviews, Xu also accepted many 
interviews with various newspapers and magazines.  For instance, in 
June 2015, Xu Kunlin accepted an interview with a magazine in 
which he discussed the negotiation with Qualcomm at length.59 
During the second Dialogue show, Xu admitted that the NDRC 
had kept a low profile during many cases that it had investigated out 
of concern of “double penalty.” 60  He explained that many firms 
requested that the NDRC not publicize their cases for fear of the 
reputational sanctions on these firms.61 However, in three cases, the 
NDRC acted as a whistle blower by strategically leaking information 
to the state media. In both the China Telecom/China Unicom Case 
and the Infant Formula Case, the agency announced its investigations 
on the CCTV.62 Additionally, in a case involving a number of gold 
retailers, the NDRC first leaked its investigation to People’s Daily.63 
As illustrated in the case studies below, such strategic leakage helps 
the agency gain the first mover advantage in framing the media 
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discussions about the cases and shaping the tones for subsequent 
outlets. Firms under investigation can also launch a countervailing 
media campaign, which occurred in the China Telecom/China 
Unicom case. However, even if these two SOEs could use other state-
controlled media to defend their conduct, this did not seem to change 
the negative perception held by the public against these two SOEs. 
Meanwhile, in the Infant Formula Case, the investigated firms all 
avoided the media and none of them made any attempt to defend 
themselves. 
A. China Telecom/China Unicom 
On November 9, 2011, 30 Minutes News, a CCTV program, 
began by referring to a recent report prepared by the National 
Telecommunication Expert Committee (Expert Report).64 The Expert 
Report noted that China’s internet speed ranks 71st in the world, less 
than one-tenth of the average speed of the OECD countries, while 
costing two or three times more.65 Then, Li Qing, a deputy director 
general at the antitrust unit of the NDRC emerged, announcing that 
her agency had been investigating two large telecommunication 
firms—China Telecom and China Unicom—for antitrust violations 
(the China Telecom and China Unicom case).66 Ms. Li claimed that 
these two SOEs had a dominant market position and that they 
together held over two-thirds of the market shares in the internet 
access market.67 According to her, these two SOEs had conducted 
price discrimination against rival companies—if these facts were to 
be ultimately proven true, these two firms could be subject to a fine of 
1-10% of the fiscal revenue, potentially up to RMB 8 billion for these 
two SOEs.68 In addition to the antitrust allegations, Ms. Li asserted 
that these two SOEs had not achieved full integration, thus increasing 
the cost of internet access for internet service providers.69 The CCTV 
program also quoted some estimates from the Expert Report, stating 
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that the internet access price will decrease 27% to 38% in five years if 
the relevant market becomes truly competitive, saving RMB ten 
billion to RMB fifteen billion for Chinese consumers.70 Ms. Li did not 
explain how the internet speed is related to the price discrimination 
conduct at issue, but her announcement left the impression that the 
abusive behavior of these two SOEs had led to the high internet prices 
and low internet speed for Chinese consumers. 
The NDRC’s announcement on the CCTV caught both SOEs by 
surprise. Both companies immediately released clarification 
statements to their investors in response to the NDRC’s 
announcement.71 In their statements, both SOEs alleged that they had 
been operating in accordance with the law and were actively 
cooperating with the NDRC’s investigations.72 As later revealed in a 
Xinhua report, the NDRC had, in fact, started to investigate China 
Telecom and China Unicom seven months ago.73 By June 2011, the 
NDRC had reached a preliminary conclusion that these two SOEs had 
abused their monopolies in the relevant market, and the two SOEs 
subsequently submitted their feedback reports.74 But the investigation 
was kept strictly confidential during that time, and employees needed 
to sign their testimonies after interviews with the NDRC.75 According 
to the Xinhua News, the NDRC held a meeting with the Legal 
Department of the State Council, the Supreme People’s Court, and the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (“MIIT”) on 
October 17, 2011.76 During the meeting, the NDRC’s proposal was 
met with significant opposition from these departments due to 
concern over the controversy, and they urged the NDRC to not reach 
its conclusion hastily before gathering solid evidence.77 During the 
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meeting, the NDRC promised that it would solicit further feedback 
from the State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (“SASAC”) and the MIIT before submitting its report to 
the State Council.78 
Thus, the NDRC’s announcement on the CCTV not only sent a 
shock to the SOEs, but also to the SASAC, the MIIT, and other 
government departments that were involved and consulted during the 
investigation. According to the Xinhua News, the surprise 
announcement on the CCTV was a deliberate tactic adopted by the 
NDRC in response to the arrogant attitude displayed by these two 
SOEs. 79  Interviews with the NDRC officials corroborate the news 
report. Insiders note that the NDRC faced significant opposition not 
only from the SOEs, but also the other bureaucratic departments, 
including the SASAC, which was concerned about the potential loss 
of state assets, and the MIIT, which was concerned that the NDRC 
was encroaching on its turf.80 By leaking the news to the CCTV, the 
NDRC hoped that public opinion against these two SOEs would in 
turn exert pressure on these two firms, making it more difficult for 
other bureaucratic departments to intervene in the matter.81 
The NDRC’s announcement on the CCTV caused a sensation in 
the Chinese media. In WiseNews, I identified fifty-eight news articles 
from fifty-one media outlets covering the investigation the day after 
the NDRC’s announcement. As the CCTV was the first to report this 
investigation, almost all news articles (with only one exception) relied 
heavily on the information disclosed by the CCTV and extensively 
quoted the remarks by Li. Among these reports, eighty-five percent 
quoted experts expressing enthusiastic support for the NDRC’s 
actions. For instance, Wang Xiaoye, a prominent antitrust expert in 
China, said that she was very pleased to see that the NDRC initiated 
this investigation.82 Hailing the case as the first antitrust investigation 
of Chinese SOEs, Professor Wang said that the case set a milestone in 
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Chinese antitrust enforcement. 83  Only five reports quoted industry 
experts who expressed doubts or confusion over the NDRC’s 
investigation.84 For instance, Yangcheng Evening News, a newspaper 
based in Guangzhou, interviewed several telecom experts who said 
that they were confused by the NDRC’s investigation.85 They said 
that the prices of broadband access had not increased significantly in 
recent years, and that broadband access in small Chinese cities is not 
very expensive. Thus, telecom should not constitute major antitrust 
concerns.86 
With almost all news outlets relying heavily on the NDRC and 
the CCTV as sources, and the vast majority of experts endorsing the 
investigation, the editorial slant is unsurprisingly very skewed against 
the SOEs. Among the fifty-eight news reports released on the day 
after the NDRC’s announcement, sixty seven percent carry a negative 
tone against the telecom firms, either by presenting one-sided 
allegations from the NDRC or by firmly endorsing the government’s 
action as a major breakthrough in antitrust enforcement. Public 
opinion was also overwhelming negative towards the SOEs. A survey 
conducted by Sina Weibo, the Chinese Twitter, on the day of the 
NDRC’s announcement shows that ninety-six percent of the 
participants believed that these two SOEs held dominant positions in 
the broadband market and that eighty-seven percent of the 
participants were dissatisfied with their performance. 87  Another 
survey conducted by China Comment reveals that ninety four percent 
of the 6,400 participants who participated in an online survey on the 
day after the NDRC’s announcement believed that these two SOEs 
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had committed antitrust violations. 88  The results indicating public 
opinion are not surprising. The Chinese public have long loathed 
large Chinese SOEs, who are often considered villains that are 
causing all sorts of problems in the Chinese economy.89 On the other 
hand, the overwhelming public support for the NDRC’s actions also 
reveals the presence of confirmation bias among the Chinese public. 
Even without any solid evidence, the Chinese public is eager to take a 
mere announcement by an antitrust agency of its investigation into the 
SOEs as evidence of the firms’ antitrust violations. 
Two days after the NDRC’s announcement of its investigation 
into China Telecom and China Unicom, the Xinhua News published a 
lengthy report, calling the NDRC’s investigation a fight among deities 
that was irrelevant for Chinese consumers. 90  A lawyer from a 
consumer association was quoted in the report, condemning the 
NDRC’s surprise announcement on the CCTV as an inappropriate 
move that “lack[ed] careful consideration.”91 He asserted that since 
the case had not been resolved, such an announcement was unfair to 
the investigated firms and could result in adverse social 
consequences. 92  As Xinhua is also a leading official newspaper 
owned by the central government, the criticisms quoted in the Xinhua 
report sent a strong signal of the dissonance within the bureaucracy 
over the NDRC’s action. The Xinhua report also quoted other 
skepticisms expressed by many telecom industry experts over the 
antitrust investigation. For instance, Wu Songning, the editor in chief 
from People’s Post and Telecommunication News (“PPTN”) clarified 
that the case actually involved the internet service provider (“ISP”) 
access market, rather than the broadband market as announced by the 
NDRC.93 He observed that the competition in the ISP market is very 
fierce, with over 700 ISP competing in the same market.94 Notably, 
PPTN is owned by the MIIT, a telecom regulator that was concerned 
that the NDRC’s investigation was encroaching on its turf. The 
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Xinhua report also hinted that many telecom experts were reluctant to 
comment on the antitrust investigation, suggesting the sensitive nature 
of the matter.95 
On November 11, 2011, the PPTN released an editorial on its 
front page entitled “Confusing Facts, Misleading Public,” directly 
rebutting the CCTV’s report.96 It began by noting that the NDRC’s 
surprised announcement distressed employees working at these two 
SOEs and caused the stock prices of these two SOEs to tumble.97 It 
then outlined four misleading facts presented in the CCTV program. 
First, the CCTV program misled the public, as the case in fact 
concerned the ISP access market, a much smaller market than the 
broadband market, which was the market initially reported to be 
involved.98 Second, the CCTV program also misled the public into 
believing that China Telecom and China Unicom held dominant 
positions in the ISP market, but this is factually wrong, as the market 
is highly competitive with many other players. 99  Third, these two 
SOEs did not conduct any price discrimination—they charged 
different prices to different firms on the basis of product 
differentiations, rather than price discrimination. 100  Finally, the 
CCTV’s mention of China’s slow broadband speed as compared with 
that of the OECD is irrelevant to the current antitrust investigation.101 
Additionally, the editorial argued that it was unfair to compare the 
internet speed in China with those in advanced countries—a fairer 
comparison would be to measure China against developing countries 
such as India and Russia.102 The editorial also severely criticized the 
lack of professional standards in the CCTV coverage, which caused 
severe reputational and financial harm to these two SOEs.103 On the 
same day, Telecommunication Industry News, another newspaper 
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owned by the MIIT, also published an editorial criticizing the CCTV 
report on the investigation.104 It argued that even if these two SOEs 
held a dominant position in the ISP access market, dominance in itself 
did not constitute a violation of the AML.105 
The skepticism portrayed in the Xinhua News and the fierce 
rebuttal launched by the two MIIT newspapers ignited another round 
of debate over this case in state-controlled media. On November 11, 
2011, the Economic Information Daily, an influential business-
oriented newspaper owned by the Xinhua News, published an 
investigative report that severely condemned the conduct of China 
Telecom and defended the NDRC’s action.106 The author asserted that 
China Telecom had abused its dominant position and suggested that 
the abusive conduct by China Telecom had resulted in broadband 
prices for Chinese enterprises that were more than four times as much 
as those in the United States. 107  According to the report, China 
Telecom conducted price discrimination in selling bandwidth to 
different ISPs and charged those larger ISPs much higher fees than 
the smaller ISPs.108 However, China Telecom soon realized that its 
differential pricing scheme led to arbitrage opportunities, as small 
ISPs packaged their bandwidth and resold it to large ones.109 After 
detecting this, China Telecom issued a notice to its subsidiaries in 
August 2010 prohibiting resale by small ISPs.110 This action resulted 
in the blackout of internet access for many large ISPs, who relied on 
the cheaper bandwidth sold by small ISPs.111 One of the companies 
that suffered a significant loss is China Railcom, a subsidiary of 
China Mobile, one of the three major state-owned telecom firms.112 
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On November 14, 2011, People’s Daily published an editorial 
that asserted that the case was not a fight between commercial deities, 
but rather an investigation that concerned the interests of millions of 
Chinese consumers.113 It reiterated the message sent in the CCTV that 
if the market competition became effective, the prices for internet 
access would increase 27-38% for consumers, saving ten billion or 
fifteen billion yuan for Chinese consumers. 114  Moreover, the non-
integration of these two SOEs not only affected the speed of the 
Internet, but also the cost of internet access.115 This editorial seems to 
be a direct rebuttal of the earlier Xinhua editorial which cast doubt 
upon the NDRC’s action. On November 15, 2011, the CCTV 
produced another TV program in response to the attack from the 
SOEs, inviting a number of telecom and legal experts to comment on 
the case.116 Gao Hongbing, a telecom expert, was quoted as stating 
that these two telecom firms’ antitrust violations were solidly 
proven. 117  He rebutted the allegation that the investigation is 
unrelated to consumer interests, noting that the failure of these two 
telecom firms to fully integrate directly harms the interests of tens of 
millions of consumers.118 On November 21, 2011, the People’s Daily 
published another editorial, entitled “Applauding the NDRC’s 
Actions,” firmly endorsing the NDRC’s intervention.119 The editorial 
approvingly declared that the NDRC’s action not only appealed to the 
popular demand of the Chinese people, but also set a milestone in 
Chinese antitrust enforcement.120 
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On December 2, 2011, the PPTN published another editorial, 
again attacking the CCTV’s report about the comparison of the 
broadband access price with other countries.121 However, on the same 
day, both China Telecom and China Unicom formally requested the 
suspension of from the NDRC’s investigation. 122  Both issued 
statements on their remedial proposal, promising to rectify their 
discriminatory conduct, to increase integration with other network, 
and to increase internet speed while lowering the cost for internet 
access in China. 123  The NDRC responded the next day, 
acknowledging the receipt of such a suspension request. However, 
there was no further disclosure regarding the matter and no fine was 
imposed on these two firms. It thus appeared that the dispute was 
resolved within the internal bureaucracy. Moreover, the 
countervailing efforts by the two SOEs did not seem to change public 
opinion. According to the polling results by Global Times, as of 
November 18, 2011, over 80% of the online participants believed that 
the conduct of China Telecom and China Unicom had constituted 
antitrust violation; seventy percent were not satisfied with their 
broadband services; and thirty percent believed that the antitrust 
investigation would help them address the problems that they met 
during broadband access.124 
The China Telecom/China Unicom case demonstrates the 
powerful feedback loop among the regulator, the Chinese media, and 
the Party. The NDRC’s strategic leakage of its investigation over the 
CCTV created nationwide common knowledge about the case. The 
stimulated responses to these reports mobilized public sentiments. 
Such sentiments were then expressed through various online and print 
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media, which were then communicated back to the Party leaders. As 
Shirk points out, the Party leaders, whose paramount priority is to 
maintain social stability, pays close attention to the media and the 
public opinion as reflected in those news reports.125 The endorsement 
from the public thus helps the NDRC remove the political obstacles 
when tackling cases, making it more difficult for opponents to 
challenge its actions. 
Despite the overwhelming public endorsement, it was never 
clear whether the NDRC had a legitimate basis to bring such a case 
and whether it benefited consumers, as the NDRC had claimed. As 
the case was suspended and no public information was revealed, there 
is very little the public could learn about this case. One commentator 
lamented in a Southern Metropolis Newspaper article, questioning 
whether the NDRC would have brought such a case had it not been a 
turf war among several state-owned telecom SOEs.126 
B. The Infant Formula Case 
Two years later, the NDRC applied the same tactic again in a 
RPM case involving nine infant formula producers. On July 1, 2013, 
the CCTV announced that it received confirmation from the NDRC 
that it was investigating Biostime and a few other manufacturers of 
infant formula. 127  This is the earliest media confirmation of the 
NDRC’s investigation, suggesting that the NDRC first leaked the 
news to the CCTV. The CCTV News quoted a report published on 
Biostime’s website, noting that Biostime is the largest player in the 
premium infant formula in China 2011, holding over forty-four 
percent of market shares.128 Also, its infant formula business grew 
rapidly and increased more than sixty one percent than the previous 
year, with its infant formula business now accounting for eighty 
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percent of its overall revenue in 2012.129 The TV report also mentions 
that Biostime had disclosed the NDRC’s investigation a few days 
earlier, causing a significant blow to its stock prices.130 One the same 
day, China Broadcast Net, a newspaper owned by the CCTV, 
published an article on its website confirming the same facts.131 The 
article also reports the phenomenon of an abnormal price increase in 
the infant formula market in recent years, with prices of foreign infant 
formula milk powders increasing by fifty percent from 2008 to 
2013.132 It states that the prices of infant formula powder in China are 
the most expensive in the world and that many Chinese consumers 
traveled abroad to purchase milk powder.133 It further suggests that 
the NDRC’s investigation is intended to quell this abnormal trend.134 
The day after the CCTV’s announcement, People’s Daily disclosed 
the names of five more companies who were also involved, claiming 
that it had obtained confirmation from the NDRC.135 This disclosure 
suggests that the NDRC leaked the information to People’s Daily and 
subjected the other five firms to a different level of publicity than 
Biostime. 
The leakage to the CCTV and People’s Daily caused a stir in 
China. In WiseNews, I identified a total of eighty-three news articles 
covering this case on July 2, 2013 (the day after the CCTV’s 
announcement) and July 3, 2013 (the day after People’s Daily’s 
announcement). Forty-seven percent of these news reports discussed 
the phenomenon of excessive pricing in the high-end infant formula 
and all of these reports carry a negative tone against the businesses. 
For example, on July 2, 2013, China Business News, one of the most 
popular financial newspapers in China, published a detailed report 
                                                                                                             
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Feng Ya, Fagawei Jiage Jiandu Jiancha Yu Fanlongduan Ju Dui Heshengyuan 
Jinxing Fanlongduan Diaocha [NDRC Launched Antitrust Investigation Into Biostime], 
FINANCE.CNR.CN(July 1, 2013), http://finance.cnr.cn/gundong/201307/t20130701_5129397
29.shtml [https://perma.cc/9DZ6-NQD2] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Zhu Jianhong, Fagaiwei Fanlongduan Ju Zhengzai Diaocha Duojia Naifen Qiye 
Shexian Jiage Longdong [NDRC Is Launching An Antitrust Investigation Into Milk Powder 
Companies Suspected of Price Monopolies], PEOPLE’S DAILY, (July 2, 2013), 
http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0703/c1004-22056243.html [https://perma.cc/5MAK-28
38] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018) (noting that MeadJohnson, Abbott, Danone, Dumex, 
FrieslandCampina and Wyeth were also investigated). 
2018] THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN ANTITRUST 499 
about how Biostime maintained an elaborate and strict price control 
system in the supply chain network to maintain its high prices.136 On 
July 3, 2013, China Business News published another story with a 
dramatized title “Cost RMB 100 but Sold at RMB 800, Some Infant 
Formula Producers Are to Be Subject to High Fines.”137 The article 
noted that ever since the milk scandal that took place in China in 
2008, Chinese consumers had lost confidence in domestically 
produced infant formula products.138 As Chinese consumers switched 
to foreign infant formula products, the foreign producers started to 
exploitatively increase the prices, causing Chinese consumers to pay 
three or even four times the prices than foreign consumers.139 The 
report quoted Wang Dingmian, a diary expert who noted that some 
infant formula producers such as Nestle charged RMB 400 per can, 
and Biostime charged RMB 500 and sometimes even RMB 800.140 
Wang called on the NDRC to impose hefty fines on these infant 
formula producers.141 He claimed that many of the foreign producers 
reaped billions of yuan from the Chinese market in the past few years, 
and thus the fine must exceed RMB one billion for it to effectively 
deter such conduct.142 
Meanwhile, the CCTV, People’s Daily, and Xinhua News, the 
three most powerful media outlets directly controlled by the central 
government, all expressed strong support for the NDRC’s action 
while condemning the misconduct of these infant formula 
manufacturers. On July 3, 2013, the CCTV produced a TV program 
that provided extensive coverage of the case.143 The TV show started 
by highlighting the phenomenon of abnormal price increases of 
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foreign milk powder since 2008.144 It then interviewed three experts, 
one of whom was a CCTV commentator, while the other two were 
leading experts on Chinese antitrust law.145 Both law professors only 
provided conclusive comments, noting that these firms tried to fix the 
resale prices of distributors and that this harmed consumers. 146 
Neither of them hinted that RPM could potentially be exempted under 
the AML, nor did they discuss whether these manufacturers could 
qualify for these exemptions.147 The CCTV commentator concluded 
that consumers placed unusually high trust in foreign milk powders 
due to quality concerns over domestic products, so they had no choice 
but to choose foreign products despite their excessive prices.148 
On the same day, People’s Daily published an editorial 
applauding the NDRC’s investigation without discussing any details 
of the case. 149  The next day, an editorial entitled “Milk Powder 
Manufacturers Faced Antitrust Investigation, Ending the Feasts of 
their Oligopolies in China” appeared at The Economic Information 
Daily, a business-oriented newspaper owned by the Xinhua News.150 
The article provides no analysis of the actual case, but simply 
condemns the excessively high prices of foreign milk powder 
manufactures. The bias against these businesses is revealed in the 
following conclusion reached in the article: “Although the final 
results of the investigation have not been released, it could be almost 
certain that the manufacturers involved have intentionally reduced 
intra-brand and inter-brand competition, in order to reinforce its 
monopoly position in China, to ensure the lowest input and to reap 
abnormal profits.”151 
                                                                                                             
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149 . Jia Zhuang, Renmin Ribao Renmin Shiping: Pochan “Yanglongduan” Youdai 
Guochan Hao Naifen [Opinions: Nine Domestic Milk Powder May Defeat the Monopolies of 
Foreign Milk Powder Companies], PEOPLE’S DAILY (July 3, 2013), http://opini
on.people.com.cn/n/2013/0703/c1003-22054806.html [https://perma.cc/ZR5N-VNXF] 
(archived on Jan. 4, 2018). 
150. Jingji Cankao Bao, Yang Naifen Mianlin Fanlongduan Diaocha Zhongjie Naifen 
Guatou De Zhongguo Shengyan [Milk Powder Manufacturers Faced Antitrust Investigation, 
Ending the Feasts of their Oligopolies in China], XINHUA (July 4, 2013), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/jcgc/20130704/152416017348.shtml [https://perma.cc/4UV
N-UHXX] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).  
151. Id. The Economic Information Daily also published another news report describing 
the reactions of the Chinese public to the NDRC’s investigations. Jingji Cankao Bao, 
2018] THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN ANTITRUST 501 
By strategically leaking information to the state media, the 
NDRC helped the news channel gain the first mover advantage in 
reporting the case. Then the CCTV’s negative coverage of Biostimes 
set the tone for subsequent news outlets. The endorsement from the 
other two main politically-controlled newspapers further reinforced 
the bias. Notably, none of the infant formula producers launched a 
countervailing media campaign to defend themselves. The lack of 
response might have been due to the pressures that they faced from 
the NDRC, who had reiterated that firms that proactively cooperated 
with the agency would be rewarded with reduced fines—implying 
that those that defended themselves would be subject to higher 
sanctions.152 Unlike China Telecom and China Unicom, foreign infant 
formula producers may have lacked the political clout to influence 
any newspapers. These producers may also believe that any defense 
will be futile given the public’s resentment towards high prices. 
Indeed, as illustrated in the China Telecom/China Unicom case, even 
if the SOEs had been able to launch a fierce combat in other state-
controlled media, this would not have changed the public opinion 
over the NDRC’s investigation. To avoid prompting retaliation from 
the regulator and potentially provoking more anger from Chinese 
consumers, a safer approach would have been to admit guilt quickly 
and reduce prices to appease consumers. 
V. THE RARITY OF DISSENTS IN CHINA 
In addition to winning a public endorsement, another important 
factor that contributed to the NDRC’s successful media campaign is 
the support that it received from Chinese antitrust experts. Antitrust is 
one of the fastest developing areas of practice in China. The severe 
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sanctions that could be imposed under the AML incentivizes 
businesses to spend resources to defend their cases. However, the lack 
of procedural safeguards and judicial oversight of agency actions 
makes the antitrust bar less effective in constraining the actions of the 
administrative authorities. Because firms very often would rather 
choose to acquiesce rather than directly challenge the agency’s 
actions in court, there is little market demand to challenge agency 
decisions in court. Private law firms, therefore, could not gain much 
by taking an aggressive, adversarial approach in defending their 
clients. Indeed, they would risk burning their bridge with the 
government if they take an antagonistic approach in dealing with the 
government. 
Moreover, for lawyers working in the antitrust field, it is vital to 
develop a good relationship with the Chinese regulators. Due to the 
opacity of the regulatory process and the great discretion that antitrust 
agencies possess, lawyers who have established good personal 
relationships with the case handlers will enjoy a competitive 
advantage in obtaining valuable information regarding the status of 
the reviews and investigations, as well as understanding the individual 
preferences of the officials involved. The more information that the 
lawyers can obtain from the regulators, the more informed and well-
played that their reactions to the regulators’ offers can be. Chinese 
antitrust lawyers thus play the critical role of what sociologist Ronald 
Burt called the information brokers.153 Their positions in the social 
network become important forms of social capital that are assets in 
their own right. 
Furthermore, Chinese antitrust lawyers and law firms are repeat 
players who have the opportunity to establish their reputations in 
antitrust practice. 154  Because interaction with the government is a 
routine part of their daily business, this incentivizes lawyers to 
achieve a reputation for cooperation. Cooperative lawyers can 
cultivate a better relationship with the agencies, which will also 
enhance their credibility in front of the regulator. For instance, in 
cartel investigations, the NDRC often requests that the suspected 
firms self-investigate and self-report any cartel conduct.155 If the firm 
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proposes that it will engage a “cooperative” law firm to do this, it 
signals the credibility156 of the self-report prepared by its lawyers.157 
This advantage, in turn, helps the lawyer attract more clients. The 
more representations that lawyers accumulate, the more experienced 
that they become, and therefore the more popular they become. 
As Gilson and Mnookin point out, law firms “provide a larger 
repository of reputational capital,” and, therefore, defection by any 
single lawyer in a single case will jeopardize the entire firm’s 
reputation with the government agency. 158  Indeed, the larger and 
more established that the firm’s antitrust practice is, the more 
reputational capital that it will have at stake, and thus the more 
reluctant that it will be to forfeit such a reputation by representing a 
client that wants to challenge the agency’s decision.159 In the worst 
situation, a non-cooperative Chinese lawyer may even face a boycott 
from the regulator.160 This action is fatal to lawyers, as being unable 
to represent the client in front of the regulator will render the lawyer 
worthless to the client. Moreover, because each of the three antitrust 
agencies is housed within large central ministries that have various 
policy controls, the law firms would anticipate repeated dealings with 
these agencies on various fronts. Therefore, few law firms with an 
established antitrust practice would dare to jeopardize their 
relationship with the central antitrust authority by bringing a suit 
against it. 
Chinese academics face the same dilemma as lawyers. While 
Chinese enforcers have been subject to fierce criticisms in foreign 
media, surprisingly these agencies face little opposition in China. 
Criticisms of government are a highly delicate issue, and academic 
freedom is limited in China.161 Moreover, as businesses cannot bring 
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the agencies to court, there is little market demand for academic 
criticisms of agency decisions in China. Indeed, Chinese antitrust 
scholars are not only assessed by their scholarly works but more 
importantly, by their connection with and proximity to the antitrust 
regulators. Similar to Chinese lawyers, an important asset of a 
Chinese legal academic is the collection of privileged sources of 
information to which he or she has access. Scholars who are favored 
by the regulators are invited to advise on large and important antitrust 
cases, which gives them valuable insights into the regulatory practice. 
The leading scholars are invited to sit on the Expert Advisory 
Committee of the Anti-Monopoly Commission (“AMC”), a 
prestigious position that also provides them with insights into the 
inner workings of the antitrust regulators. Thus, the last thing that 
antitrust experts want is to develop a reputation for criticizing the 
regulators, or they will find it difficult to maintain their connections 
with the regulators and may face retaliation in the future, as 
demonstrated by the Zhang Xinzhu incident below. 
A. Public Criticisms of RPM Decisions 
RPM investigations have constituted one of the NDRC’s most 
important enforcement priorities in recent years. From 2008 to 2015, 
the NDRC brought four large RPM cases in industries involving 
white liquor, infant formula, eye glasses, and auto parts. However, 
RPM cases are also very controversial from a legal standpoint, and 
economists have identified many procompetitive reasons why firms 
would choose to conduct such practices.162 Even if a firm has been 
found to have committed RPM practice, it is far from clear that such 
conduct is anticompetitive or would harm the interests of consumers. 
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the century-old 
precedent in the Dr. Miles resale price maintenance agreement case 
and endorsed a more lenient rule of reason approach in investigating 
RPM.163 Despite such controversy over RPM practices, criticisms of 
the NDRC’s investigations into RPM cases were scant. 
In the WiseNews database, I found no criticisms of the agency’s 
investigation in the White Liquor Case. I was able to identify four 
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editorials that expressed skepticism about the NDRC’s legal position 
in the Infant Formula Case, but they represent a mere one percent of 
all the news reports that I found on WiseNews. 
The first editorial, published in the Beijing News on July 3, 
2013, was contributed by a columnist who analyzed the legal merits 
of the NDRC’s investigation. 164  The article discussed the recent 
precedents involving resale price maintenance and highlighted the 
decision delivered by the Shanghai Intermediate Court involving 
Johnson & Johnson’s resale price maintenance practice. 165  In that 
case, the Shanghai court applied a rule of reason analysis similar to 
the one applied by the United States Supreme Court in Leegin.166 
After finding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy its burden of proof, the 
court dismissed its action.167 The author suggested that the NDRC’s 
analysis of the Infant Formula Case should adopt a similar rule of 
reason analysis and take into account those competition factors 
applied in the Johnson & Johnson case.168 Only two days later, the 
same columnist contributed another editorial in Beijing News.169 He 
alleged that the NDRC was adopting a per se illegal approach in 
analyzing resale price maintenance cases.170 He noted that the NDRC 
had taken a highly controversial position which was blatantly 
inconsistent with the Shanghai court’s judgment in Johnson & 
Johnson case.171 He further explained that dairy companies chose not 
to defend themselves because the NDRC possessed significant 
discretion under the AML in determining legal sanctions, and that 
these companies therefore offered significant price reductions in order 
to appease the regulator in the hope of a lower fine.172 Finally, the 
author noted that in the absence of clear guidelines from the Supreme 
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People’s Court on how to interpret the relevant provision under the 
AML, no company would dare to challenge the NDRC’s cases in 
court.173 
The second editorial, published by Beijing Times, was 
contributed by Mei Xinyu, a researcher from the MOFCOM on July 
10, 2013.174 Mei used a skeptical tone and suggested that the NDRC’s 
legal basis is probably wrong.175 Mei first argued that the NDRC’s 
case rested on dubious grounds—vertical agreements should not be 
illegal per se, and there are many procompetitive justifications for 
such actions. 176  Moreover, the cause for the high prices of infant 
formula powder in China lies not in an antitrust problem, but rather in 
the low rate of breastfeeding, the irrational quest for foreign milk 
powder, and the excessive layers of sales channels.177 Criticism from 
MOFCOM is not surprising. Even though both MOFCOM and the 
NDRC are central ministries, they have different bureaucratic 
interests—the former endorses the open market and reform, whereas 
the latter favors industrial policy and direct intervention in the 
market.178 
The third editorial, published in the Economic Observer on July 
25, 2017, was contributed by a journalist.179 The author argued that an 
RPM conduct by a firm that lacks significant market power is 
unlikely to cause any anticompetitive harm.180 She noted that Chinese 
infant formula market was highly fragmented, with the largest 
producer, MeadJohnson, holding a mere 12.3% of the shares in the 
market. 181  Moreover, the public’s call for price reduction through 
regulatory intervention could not resolve the long-term issue of the 
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mistrust that Chinese consumers placed in domestic infant formula.182 
The editorial also warned of the unintended consequences that might 
follow as a result of the NDRC’s pressures on these producers to 
reduce prices. 183  In the end, the author called for more 
professionalism in the enforcement of the AML.184 
The fourth editorial, published in Beijing News on August 1, 
2013, was contributed by You Yunting, a lawyer based in 
Shanghai. 185  In this editorial, You expressed skepticism that the 
NDRC’s actions could rein in high prices for infant formula in 
China.186 He noted that the NDRC possessed significant discretion in 
setting the fines. Thus, the infant formula producers offered price 
reductions for fear of higher sanctions. 187  However, such price 
reductions are only temporary, and it is unrealistic to hope that an 
antitrust investigation can rein in prices, as the ultimate pricing power 
still lies with the producers.188 Moreover, You believed that the cause 
of high prices of infant formula in China had less to do with resale 
price maintenance, but rather with the mistrust that Chinese 
consumers placed on domestic infant formula products.189 Besides, 
there is an academic controversy regarding the anti-competitiveness 
of the resale price maintenance practices itself. 190  As a legal 
specialist, You’s critical comments on the NDRC’s investigation 
would strike many as bold. However, he is not a specialist in antitrust 
law, though his practice encompasses a wide range of corporate and 
litigation matters. Thus, he had much less to lose, even if his 
comments did upset those working inside the NDRC. 
The above-mentioned articles were published in commercialized 
media outlets, but none of them generated much fanfare in the press, 
nor were they reproduced in any other news outlets. Moreover, none 
of the articles were contributed by a well-established antitrust 
academic or lawyer. Even though several leading Chinese antitrust 
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experts were interviewed and commented on the case, none of them 
voiced any doubts about the NDRC’s investigation. 
Similarly, I found only one critical editorial on the Auto Part 
Case in WiseNews and the author, Liu Zichuan was a columnist.191 In 
this editorial entitled “Antitrust: The Government Should Played the 
Role As A Nightwatchman,” Liu advocated for four things: first, a 
pattern of high prices in itself should not constitute an antitrust 
violation; second, resale price maintenance conduct has many pro-
competitive justifications and is unlikely to trigger antitrust concerns 
in a competitive market; third, the power of the regulator should also 
be checked; and fourth, the priority for Chinese antitrust enforcement 
should be administrative abuse, rather than market abuse, as the 
market also has a self-correcting function. 192  Despite being a 
generalist, Liu seems to possess a clear understanding of the relevant 
literature in Chinese antitrust. It is not entirely clear whether there 
were ghostwriters behind him that contributed to the editorial, but it 
expressed the legitimate concern about the NDRC’s enforcement in 
resale price maintenance cases. Unfortunately, similar to those in the 
Infant Formula Case, the editorial attracted little attention and 
generated no response from any other media outlets. The critical 
voices were too dim to be heard. 
B. The Controversy in A Telecom Case 
In contrast to the scant criticisms in RPM cases, criticisms 
abounded in the China Telecom and China Unicom Case. In my 
WiseNews sample, over twelve percent of the news articles (25 out of 
202) quoted experts who criticized the NDRC’s investigation, 
compared with thirty seven percent (76 out of 202) who quoted 
experts who expressed endorsement. Almost all those experts who 
provided critical comments are experts in the telecom industry; no 
antitrust scholar cast any doubt, with the only exception of Zhang 
Xinzhu.193 Zhang is a preeminent Chinese scholar from the Academy 
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of Social Science, and received his doctoral degree from the Toulouse 
School of Economics, under the supervision of Jean-Jacques 
Laffont.194 Unlike most antitrust scholars, Zhang is an expert in both 
telecommunication regulation and antitrust regulation. Long before he 
advised on antitrust matters, he had served as an advisor for Chinese 
telecom firms and the telecom regulator MIIT.195 Zhang also served 
on the Expert Advisory Committee to the AMC.196 The Committee 
comprises of twenty one experts in law, economics, and various 
industry sectors.197 
Two days after the NDRC’s announcement of its investigation 
into China Telecom and China Unicom, the Oriental Morning Post 
interviewed Zhang, who provided very critical comments on the 
NDRC’s antitrust investigation. 198  Zhang asserted that the internet 
retail access market has already been liberalized, so the competition 
was very fierce, and the differential pricing reflected a market 
outcome.199 He pointed out that there was insufficient evidence to 
conclude that these two SOEs had committed antitrust violations.200 
He criticized the NDRC for inappropriately assuming the role of a 
telecom regulator, as the matter should have been handled jointly by 
both the antitrust and the telecom regulators.201 He suggested that a 
wiser solution for the NDRC would be to promote institutional 
restructuring.202 Zhang also expressed worry over the absence of the 
participation of economists during the enforcement of the AML in the 
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past three years, arguing that economists should have played a 
prominent role in enforcing antitrust law.203 He criticized the NDRC’s 
overzealous attempt to regulate while ignoring the proper rules or 
standards in antitrust enforcement.204 Lastly, Zhang condemned the 
agency’s tactic of using public opinion against these telecom SOEs 
and failing to make full disclosure of the case.205 
After the two SOEs requested the suspension of the NDRC’s 
investigation, Zhang contributed another editorial to the Oriental 
Morning Post. 206  Zhang first observed that the NDRC’s proactive 
disclosure of the case on the CCTV was a skillful move to leverage 
the public’s resentment against those state monopolies, and the 
NDRC successfully achieved its objective in mobilizing public 
sentiment.207 However, as he pointed out, such a strategic move is 
problematic from the perspective of antitrust law enforcement. 208 
Zhang argued that antitrust enforcement should not be interfered with 
by public opinion, but rather be grounded in law and facts.209 Zhang 
acknowledged that room for improvement remains in the regulation 
of the telecom industry. However, he also condemned the NDRC’s 
practice, stating that no other antitrust enforcement agency in the 
world would use the media to influence the antitrust enforcement 
outcome. 210 Zhang argued that antitrust enforcers should rationally 
consider requests from rivals, as the spirit of the antitrust law is to 
protect competition, rather than competitors.211 He noted that while 
the interest groups involved in this case remain a mystery, rival state-
owned telecom firms seemed to have played a role in pushing the 
NDRC into investigating these two SOEs. 212  He warned antitrust 
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regulators that they should be vigilant about the strategic use of the 
antitrust law to harm rivals.213 
Zhang then moved on to analyze the legal merits of this case. He 
first clarified that the AML only prohibits abuse of dominant position, 
and the possession of a monopoly position is not illegal per se.214 He 
then noted that it was not even clear whether these two telecom SOEs 
held a dominant position in the relevant market in the first place.215 
Even if they did, as Zhang argued, the regulators would still need to 
satisfy a high burden of proof in proving the abusive conduct of these 
two firms.216 Zhang advocated a rule of reason approach in analyzing 
the alleged price discrimination by these two SOEs.217 Moreover, he 
outlined a number of reasons for defending the pricing practices of 
these two telecom firms, arguing that the existing evidence gathered 
by the NDRC was insufficient to prove the alleged abusive conduct of 
these two SOEs. 218  Last but not least, he proposed that the 
fundamental solution for reforming Chinese telecom industry lies in 
property reform.219 He argued that without such market reforms, there 
would not be effective competition in the telecom industry, and he 
warned against the scenario in which an antitrust regulator would 
become a de facto price regulator of the telecom industry.220 He also 
criticized the remedies requested by the NDRC in regulating the 
interconnection prices charged by these two SOEs, stating that it 
would be an undesirable form of price regulation that would lack a 
basis under the AML.221 
Among the experts who have served on the Expert Advisory 
Committee to AMC, Zhang is the only antitrust expert who dared to 
challenge the NDRC’s position publicly thus far. However, his 
outspoken comments also spell impending trouble for himself. 
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C. The Dismissal of An Antitrust Expert 
On August 12, 2014, news broke that Zhang Xinzhu had been 
sacked from the Expert Advisory Committee to the AMC after 
allegedly accepting a large sum for defending Qualcomm. 222  The 
news caused a stir in the Chinese media. It also surprised Zhang, who 
told news reporter that he was not aware of this until he learned it 
from the newspaper.223 Zhang claimed that he had been dismissed 
from the Committee for “speaking for foreign businesses.” 224  He 
recalled that the chair of the Committee, Zhang Qiong, had asked him 
to conduct a self-assessment of his consulting practice for Qualcomm 
a few months earlier.225 Zhang Qiong reprimanded Zhang Xinzhu for 
speaking for foreign firms and opposing the government’s position.226 
Zhang analogized his situation as a criminal defense lawyer: “It’s like 
I am defending a criminal facing death sentence. Every case should 
have two sides, they couldn’t deprive my rights to speak.”227 Zhang 
claimed that the trigger for this case was not Qualcomm.228 As a vocal 
critic of the NDRC in the China Telecom and China Unicom Case, 
Zhang explained that his comments created many obstacles for the 
agency.229 As he confessed with the newspaper: “Currently, China’s 
administrative law enforcement is extremely dangerous, with 
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investigative powers and law enforcement powers bound together.”230 
Zhang was pessimistic about the future of China’s antitrust 
enforcement, as he lamented: “From the viewpoint of administrative 
enforcement of the law, China’s anti-monopoly law is at a dead end. 
The judiciary is the only hope.”231 
On August 13, 2014, there was widespread speculation on 
Chinese media that Zhang Xinzhu had accepted six million in 
compensation for speaking for Qualcomm, although it was not clear 
whether the figure was in US dollars or RMB.232 For instance, the 21st 
Century Business Herald, a popular business newspaper in China, 
published an article entitled “Zhang Xinzhu Responded to the 
Allegation of Accepting 6 Million Bribery from Qualcomm: 
Bullshit.”233 The use of “bribery” suggested that Zhang’s consulting 
for Qualcomm was illegal. Zhang strongly denied this allegation, but 
the figure was widely quoted by major newspapers. On WiseNews, I 
found that almost all of the news articles published the next day 
mentioned Zhang’s compensation of six million. On August 13, 2014, 
Xinhua News published an editorial entitled “Those Experts Who 
Fished in Troubled Water, Living on Our Country While Leaking 
Secrets to Others Are Not Tolerated.”234 The editorial carried a very 
harsh tone, condemning the fact that Zhang used his title as a member 
of the Expert Advisory Committee to back foreign firms. 235  The 
editorial also suggests that even though Zhang is a very 
knowledgeable expert, his behavior should be condemned as 
unethical.236 It noted that some multi-national companies tried to use 
all sorts of tactics to defend themselves and delay the investigations 
into them.237 Moreover, those government experts who worked for 
foreign firms violated the disciplinary rules and such conduct should 
be penalized.238 As Xinhua is regarded as a Party mouthpiece, this 
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editorial signaled that the Chinse leadership had set the tone for the 
incident. The editorial was highly influential. In the WiseNews 
database, I found ten news articles published on the same date that 
directly copied the editorial from Xinhua. 
On the same day, the CCTV produced another TV program 
reporting the case.239 The discussion revolved around the conflict of 
interest issue in this case and interviewed Ren Yuling, a consultant for 
the State Council.240 Mr. Ren was concerned about the Zhang Xinzhu 
incident, noting that it was not purely a commercial matter and that it 
might have also affected the national interest.241 As Zhang might leak 
information to foreign firms, Ren hinted that there could be 
corruption.242 Mr. Ren then called for more laws to be promulgated to 
address such problems.243 Meanwhile, several newspapers hinted that 
Zhang could be subject to legal sanctions. On August 14, 2014, 
Global Times released an editorial, noting that it was not clear 
whether Zhang Xinzhu possessed state secrets when serving on the 
Expert Advisory Committee and thus his consulting service to 
Qualcomm may amount to the selling of state secrets. 244  Yangtze 
News also speculated that Zhang might have had the capacity to 
obtain state secrets. 245  The article pointed to Article 111 of the 
Criminal Law, which states that the sale of state secrets could be 
subject to a jail sentence of up to imprisonment for life.246 
On August 14, 2014, Qualcomm representatives denied direct 
compensation for Zhang Xinzhu, clarifying that Qualcomm instead 
hired Global Economics, an economic consultancy where Zhang 
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served as an expert.247 Qualcomm also noted that the engagement of 
economic experts was standard practice during antitrust 
investigations.248 Zhang refused to provide further comments during 
an interview with a newspaper, alleging that the current media 
environment was very hostile.249 On September 11, 2014, Xu Kunlin, 
the former director general of the antitrust unit at the NDRC made a 
detailed explanation of the dismissal of Zhang Xinzhu during a press 
conference.250 Xu explained the dismissal had to do with a research 
report that Qualcomm submitted to the NDRC, in which Zhang was 
one of the three contributors. 251  The NDRC claimed that Zhang 
Xinzhu was supposed to receive USD 1.4 million from Qualcomm for 
his advisory service, and until the time that he was sacked, he had 
received USD 77,000.252 
In WiseNews, I identified sixty news articles discussing the 
dismissal of Zhang Xinzhu from the date of the first public disclosure 
of his dismissal to the day before the NDRC released its decision in 
Qualcomm. Among these articles, ninety-three percent noted that 
Zhang Xinzhu had accepted high compensation from Qualcomm for 
defending the firm and forty-six percent mentioned that he accepted 
six million from Qualcomm; some articles reported that that figure 
was in dollars, but others were ambiguous. Forty-seven percent 
expressly condemned and criticized Zhang’s conduct. Public opinion 
was also hostile toward Zhang Xinzhu. A poll on Sina shows that 
eighty percent of those surveyed believed that Zhang Xinzhu had 
some illicit dealings with Qualcomm.253 Only two editorials that I 
identified in WiseNews defended Zhang Xinzhu. The first article was 
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published by Legal Evening News on August 15, 2014.254 The article 
mentioned that the media coverage had been highly biased—it was 
widely reported that Zhang accepted six million from Qualcomm, 
even before it verified the currency in which the money was paid.255 
The editorial also argued that the AMC is not a law enforcement 
agency, nor a working commission, such as the SASAC.256 It clarified 
that the main function of the Expert Advisory Committee is to 
provide advice to antitrust policy-making and enforcement, and it 
lacked the power to influence decision-making directly. 257  The 
editorial also noted that members of the Expert Advisory Committee 
should have the freedom to conduct consulting work as long as they 
were not advising the AMC.258 Even if Zhang had accepted financial 
benefits from advising an investigated firm, the main focus should be 
whether the reasoning and the analysis performed by the expert made 
sense.259 However, such defense of Zhang was not well-received. In 
WiseNews, I found no article that made an effort to understand the 
substantive arguments proposed by Zhang. Rather, the focus was on 
how much money that he had received from Qualcomm and whether 
he should be dismissed for violating the disciplinary rules of the 
Expert Advisory Committee. 
The second editorial was published by the Securities Times on 
August 18, 2014.260 It first argued that lobbying is different from rent 
seeking; the former is legal, while the latter is not.261 It noted that one 
characteristic of the NDRC’s enforcement is that it would give 
generous leniency to those companies that readily admitted their guilt 
and imposed higher sanctions on those that tried to defend 
themselves. 262  This method deterred firms from challenging the 
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NDRC in court and it had worked perfectly well thus far.263 Thus, the 
NDRC wanted to deter Qualcomm from suing the agency even before 
it formally released its decision, and the Zhang Xinzhu incident was a 
deliberate act of hitting the mountain to scare the tiger (meaning 
“showing of strength as a warning”) to deter Qualcomm from 
challenging its case in court.264 The editorial argued that firms subject 
to an antitrust investigation should have the freedom to engage 
experts to lobby the government, as long as such lobbying is made 
public. 265  The author lamented that some foreign firms become 
corrupt after they start operating in China, many of which would not 
resort to rent seeking if such lobbying were effective.266 
Despite the doubts expressed in these two editorials, no other 
reports in the WiseNews sample defended Zhang Xinzhu. For 
instance, China Business News interviewed several leading Chinese 
antitrust experts in early October 2014. 267  The interviewees 
unanimously believed that Zhang had violated the conflict of interest 
rules while serving as a member of the Expert Advisory 
Committee. 268  One antitrust expert was quoted as follows: “The 
figure (of Qualcomm’s compensation for Zhang) is too big, it is 
difficult for me to imagine such an amount. Is there something wrong 
here? If he was not a member of the Expert Advisory Committee, 
would he be able to receive such a high sum?” 269 Another expert 
recalled that he accepted an advisory project with a multinational firm 
in 2004 but only asked for RMB 50,000.270 Many believed that Zhang 
Xinzhu received such high compensation because of his affiliation 
with the Expert Advisory Committee. 271  According to the news, 
Qualcomm had tried to engage several experts who served on the 
Expert Advisory Committee, but Zhang Xinzhu was the only one who 
accepted the job. 
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VI. THE POPULIST DEMAND 
Critical comments over the NDRC’s actions were rare, but their 
existence also demonstrates that public criticism of administrative 
enforcement is not a taboo subject or politically sensitive news 
subject to censorship. After all, the Chinese media is the mouth and 
ears for the Party, and abuse of administrative discretion of low-level 
officials are frequently exposed under the spotlight in the Chinese 
media. Then how do we explain the rarity of such critical comments? 
As explained in the previous section, the strategic leakage of 
information from regulators to media outlets, and the self-censorship 
by Chinese antitrust experts, distorts the supply of media coverage 
over Chinese antitrust. However, the problem is not just the 
manipulation of supply, but a more fundamental one—the consumer 
demand also creates disincentives for media to expose negative news 
about antitrust interventions. 
Abundant literature by economists and political scientists show 
that readers find a news report more credible and memorable when its 
story is consistent with their beliefs.272 Economists have also found 
that newspapers have incentives to slant their news in the same 
direction, as media spinning will make their news reports more 
credible and memorable to readers.273 Indeed, the loosening of state 
control over the Chinese media has enhanced its ability to respond to 
consumer demand. Commercialized media in China, therefore, has 
the incentive to appeal to or even create popular opinion.274 Topics 
that stimulate popular sentiments will tend to attract an audience. As 
illustrated in the examples below, the Chinese public loathes high 
prices and applauds the antitrust regulator’s vow to reduce prices for 
consumers. As such, the media is more concerned about the effects of 
the antitrust investigation on consumer prices, rather than its 
legitimacy. Nationalist sentiments can also be easily stirred up when a 
famous domestic brand is being acquired by a large multinational 
firm. The media’s focus is not on whether the foreign acquisition 
                                                                                                             
272. See generally Russell J. Dalton et. al., Partisan Cues and the Media: Information 
Flows in the 1992 Presidential Election, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1998); Robert Erikson, 
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273. See Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, Media Bias, HARVARD INSTITUTE OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH DISCUSSION PAPER (2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9295.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2K2-GUEU] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). 
274. Liebman, supra note 21, at 8. 
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violates the AML, but rather whether the transaction should be 
blocked because of its threat to domestic industries. 
A. Price Regulator in RPM Cases 
To gauge how the media “adjudicates” a RPM case before the 
NDRC makes its decision, I focus my study on the three RPM cases 
in which there were prior public disclosures of the investigations 
before the agency released its decisions. Using the WiseNews 
database, I searched for relevant news articles275 on each of the cases 
during the period between the first public disclosure of the 
investigation276 and the day before the NDRC’s decision.277 
Two major themes emerge from a review of the coverage in the 
Infant Formula Case and the Auto Part Case. One is the condemnation 
of excessive pricing. Many reports discussed the abnormal profits 
reaped by the firms involved, the unusually high prices of these 
consumer products, or the comparison of the prices of products in 
China and elsewhere. The other theme centers around the price 
reduction voluntarily offered by the companies under investigation. 
Just two days after the NDRC’s announcement, Wyeth announced a 
price reduction for its milk powder and others quickly followed.278 
Similarly, some manufacturers proactively offered to reduce the 
prices of their auto parts in response to the NDRC’s probe into the 
auto industry. 279  Most news articles focused on various topics 
                                                                                                             
275. For the Infant Formula Case, I conducted my search using the key words “milk 
powder and NDRC”; for the White Liquor Case, I conducted my search using the key words 
“Maotai or Wuliangye and NDRC”; for the Auto Part Case, I conducted my search using the 
key words “Auto and NDRC.” For all these searches, I used the WiseNews database and 
limited my search on news articles published by media outlets in mainland China. 
276 . In each of these three cases, it were the companies that first disclosed the 
investigation. 
277. In both the White Liquor Case and the Infant Formula Case, the decisions were 
made on all companies under investigation at the same time. However, because the Auto Part 
Case was investigated by different local authorities of the NDRC, the decisions were imposed 
by different authorities on different dates. For the purpose of this study, I used the date of the 
first the NDRC decision released by Hubei Price Bureau on BMW dealers as the decision date. 
278. Southern Daily, Huishi Naifen Zuigao Jiangjia Ercheng Yangnaifen Fanlongduan 
Diaocha Xiaoying Chuxian [The Price of Wyeth Has Been Reduced By 20% at Most; The 
Antitrust Investigation on Foreign Milk Powder Companies Has Begun to Work], XINLANG 
CAIJING [SINA FIN.] (July 4, 2013), http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2013/07-04/
5001321.shtml [https://perma.cc/Y938-3K2N] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). 
279. Tom Mitchell, China Antitrust Ruling Blunts Foreign Criticisms, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(August 21, 2014), at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/61d3f8aa-28ff-11e4-9d5d-00144feab
dc0.html#slide0 [https://perma.cc/H6PX-N6UZ] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018). 
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revolving around price reductions, such as the magnitude of the price 
reductions, whether they actually took place, whether such price 
reductions were only short-lived, whether they would benefit 
consumers in the long term, and whether such price reductions would 
benefit or harm domestic manufacturers. Noticeably, very few media 
reports tried to understand the legal basis for the NDRC’s 
intervention, i.e., the legal merits of the case. Fewer mentioned that 
there were actually grounds for an exemption for resale price 
maintenance practices under the AML. 280 Rarely did news articles 
cast doubt as to the legitimacy of the NDRC’s legal intervention. In 
comparison, the White Liquor Case attracted much less publicity, and 
there were far fewer reports that condemned Maotai’s or Wuliangye’s 
pricing. As neither company offered to reduce prices in this case, 
there was also no mention of price reductions in this case. 
I analyze the content of each article by coding it as covering 
each of the following five issues: excessive pricing of the products or 
abnormal profits by the manufacturers (“Excessive Pricing”), price 
reduction offered by the manufacturers (“Price Reduction”), legal 
basis for the NDRC’s intervention (“Legal Merits”), grounds of 
exemption for manufacturers under the AML (“Exemption”), and 
doubts about the NDRC’s legal basis (“Doubts”). An article will be 
coded as “1” if it has devoted at least one sentence281 to discussing the 
underlying topic. Otherwise, it is coded as “0”. A particular article 
could receive multiple codes if, for example, it focused on multiple 
topics. Figure 1 presents the percentages of the reports that covered a 
particular topic among all the news reports on each case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
280. Art. 15, AML. 
281. Sometimes an article only mentions a few words that are relevant to the topic but 
they are only tangential to the discussion. In these circumstances, the article will be coded as 0. 
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FIGURE 1: TOPICS OF DISCUSSION IN THE NEWS 
COVERAGE OF THE THREE MAJOR RPM CASES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, rather than injecting more transparency into the 
investigation, many commercialized media sources in these cases 
acted as cheerleaders for the regulator, aided and abetted the antitrust 
regulator to monitor prices, and coerced firms to reduce prices, all 
without clear evidence that the firm had committed an antitrust 
violation in the first place. A few examples will illustrate this. On July 
11, 2013, Beijing Morning Post reported the price reductions offered 
by the infant formula producers.282 The journalist inspected the prices 
of the infant formula products made by the several firms subject to the 
NDRC’s investigation and was disappointed to find no reduction in 
retail prices on the shelves.283 Several supermarkets explained that it 
would take a couple of days for them to adjust the prices.284 On July 
13, 2013, another journalist inspected several supermarkets to monitor 
the price reductions of the infant formula products.285 She found that 
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the prices for several brands had decreased—noting, for instance, 
Wyeth had offered 11%-20% reduction for certain infant formula 
products.286 However, consumers were still not satisfied, noting that 
the prices for the stage 1 and stage 2 infant formula products had 
remained the same.287 In another news report published by National 
Business Daily, a reporter found that Wyeth even attempted to 
increase the prices by introducing new infant formula products that 
were closely similar to the previous product.288 
Such a hostile media environment exerted pressure on firms to 
reduce prices to appease the disgruntled consumers. However, 
voluntary price reduction also generated great fanfare in the media 
and sent a signal to the public that these firms had indeed committed 
an antitrust violation by overcharging consumers. The public’s 
attention to the scale and scope of the price reduction overshadowed 
the fundamental question about the legitimacy of the regulator’s 
intervention in the first place. 
B. Nationalism and Merger Control 
In China, foreign acquisition of domestic assets can easily 
become an emotionally charged hot button issue. As Susan Shirk once 
commented: “Nationalist themes struck a chord in a country seeking 
to revive itself as a major power after over a century of humiliating 
weakness vis-à-vis foreign powers.” 289 The Chinese government is 
ambivalent toward the nationalist slant in the Chinese media.290 On 
the one hand, nationalism appeared to be an effective way to foster 
popular identification with the Chinese government.291 On the other 
hand, the government is concerned that the Chinese public might 
topple its power if they perceive the government as weak for not 
                                                                                                             
Massive Discounts of Retail Prices Haven’t Appeared], JINRI ZAOBAO [TODAY MORNING 
POST] (July 13, 2013), http://finance.huanqiu.com/industry/2013-07/4127805.html [https://
perma.cc/ZNS3-CL5S] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018). 
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287. Id. 
288. Guo Mengyi & Wang Xia, Huishi Beizhi Xin Peifang Zhanghui Yuanjia Huoying 
Zhong Pingpai Gengfeng, MEIJING [NBD.COM] (July 31, 2013), http://www.nbd.com.cn/
articles/2013-07-31/762556.html [https://perma.cc/9RV9-AZTE] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). 
289 . See Susan L. Shirk, Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China, 8 
JAPANESE J. POL. SC. 43, 45 (2007). 
290. Id., at 242. 
291. Id. 
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standing up to the foreign powers. 292  As illustrated in the Coca-
Cola/Huiyuan case below, widespread nationalist sentiments could 
exert pressure on the antitrust regulator to take a tough stand in 
reviewing an acquisition from a foreign buyer. 
On September 3, 2008, Huiyuan, a famous Chinese juice 
manufacturer, announced that it was selling its shares to Coca-Cola 
for twenty billion HKD (approximately 2.5 billion USD).293 This was 
the largest acquisition of a Chinese firm and the news caused a 
sensation overnight. According to an online survey by Sina Net, as of 
September 4, 2008, over 100,000 online participants took the survey, 
of whom eighty-two percent opposed the transaction, and of whom 
eighty-three percent believed that the transaction would destroy a 
leading domestic company.294 This results of the online survey were 
widely quoted by the Chinese media. In the WiseNews database, I 
identified 655 pieces of relevant news articles from the date of Coca-
Cola’s announcement to the day before MOFCOM’s prohibition 
decision, among which 150 quoted the survey results. 
A number of news articles expressed doubts about the 
acquisition. For instance, on September 9, 2008, Economy 
Information Daily, a business-oriented newspaper owned by Xinhua 
Newspaper, published an editorial warning regulators of the foreign 
acquisitions of domestic brands.295 It noted that over seventy percent 
of the traditional Chinese brands have disappeared after the flooding 
of foreign brands and those brands produced by joint ventures.296 It 
also highlighted several examples where Chinese brands disappeared 
after acquisitions by foreign firms. 297 It called on the regulator to 
strengthen its regulation and to tighten control over the foreign 
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acquisitions of domestic brands. 298  On September 8, 2008, the 
People’s Net, a website owned by People’s Daily, published a long 
article summarizing the public’s reactions to the merger.299 It noted 
that the results of the Sina survey suggested that an overwhelming 
percentage of Chinese citizens strongly opposed the transaction.300 It 
then highlighted examples of the foreign acquisitions of famous 
domestic brands. 301  It should be noted, however, that those news 
articles that vehemently opposed the transaction only account for a 
small minority. Many others are neutral, or even supportive of the 
transaction. For example, Zhu Xingli, the chairman of the Huiyuan 
Juice Company, tried to placate nationalistic sentiments, stating that 
the sale is a purely commercial act, rather than anything symbolic.302 
He said that companies should be raised like sons but sold like pigs, 
and this statement was widely quoted by Chinese newspapers.303 
On September 9, 2008, Beijing Youth Daily published an 
editorial entitled “Probably Difficult for Coke to Swallow Huiyuan,” 
highlighting the two challenges for Coca-Cola.304 The first challenge 
was the national sentiments that were expressed through online 
surveys and the news coverage. 305  The second challenge was the 
recent scandal involving Sun Jingyi, a MOFCOM official in charge of 
approving foreign acquisitions of domestic assets.306 On September 
25, 2008, Southern Weekend published a lengthy and detailed report 
of the corruption case involving Sun, who abused his administrative 
power when conducting merger reviews.307 According to the report, 
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Sun colluded with his friends who worked at law firms and accepted 
bribes in exchange for the approvals of foreign acquisitions of 
domestic assets. 308  MOFCOM officials denied that they were 
influenced by any factors other than competition. However, it was 
widely speculated among experts in China that the excessive media 
coverage over this transaction contributed to MOFCOM’s 
prohibition.309 As admitted by Lin Zheying, a spokesperson from the 
Foreign Investment Bureau of MOFCOM, in January 2009, the 
potential interference of the widespread media coverage of this case 
was one of the challenges posed to MOFCOM in dealing with its 
merger review.310 
During this period, no news report discussed the legal merits of 
the case. The focus of the debate in the media is about whether 
nationalism should prevail in a merger transaction, not whether the 
transaction should be blocked under Chinese antitrust law. The biased 
media coverage also partly reflects the limited public awareness of the 
rule of law in China. As the general public lacks a sophisticated 
knowledge in antitrust law, they may judge MOFCOM’s performance 
based on their understanding of fairness and justice. As such, 
MOFCOM may be condemned as passive and incompetent had it 
approved the transaction. Following the scandal of Sun Jingyi, the 
public may even call for a probe into the MOFCOM officials for their 
failure to block the deal. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Understanding the role of media is crucial to understanding the 
forces that have shaped the outcome in Chinese antitrust law. 
Through the extensive analysis of the media coverage of six high 
profile cases brought by the NDRC during 2008 to 2015, this Article 
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illustrates the complex relationship that exists between the Chinese 
antitrust regulators, the media, and the Party during antitrust 
enforcement. Chinese antitrust regulators are policy entrepreneurs 
who are adept at using the media to mobilize public sentiments to 
push forward difficult cases. They strategically leak information to 
the state media in an attempt to manipulate the supply of information 
to the public and then leverage the public endorsement to win 
political support. Meanwhile, Chinese antitrust lawyers and 
academics have a vested interest in promoting antitrust enforcement 
and those who voice dissent face retaliation from the government. 
This dampens public criticism over agency decisions. However, the 
problem of the media’s bias is not just driven by these supply factors, 
but also demand side bias. In response to the populist demand to 
reduce consumer prices and nationalistic concerns, the media lacks 
the incentive to publicize criticism of regulatory interventions. As 
such, consumer demand converges with the regulatory demand for 
intervention in these industries. This suggests that even if the judicial 
oversight over administrative discretion is strengthened in China, and 
the Chinese antitrust experts are incentivized to voice dissents, the 
disincentives of the media to diffuse negative news about the 
regulatory intervention will probably persist. 
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311. MOFCOM, Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Shangwubu Gongbao [The Public 
Announcement of MOFCOM of the People’s Republic of China], No 22, 2009, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.shtml [https://perma.cc/6QFJ-
MZDN] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
312. No official decision was released in this case. For details of this case please see 
Xiaoye Wang, The China Telecom and China Unicom Case and the Future of Chinese 
Antitrust, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 467, 469 (Adrian Emch 
& David Stallibrass eds., 2013). 
Decision 
Year 
Case Name Description 
2009 Coca-Cola/ 
Huiyuan 
In March 2009, MOFCOM announced that it 
had blocked Coca-Cola’s proposed 
acquisition of Huiyuan, a Chinese juice 
manufacturer primarily on the ground that 
Coca-Cola could have the ability to leverage 
its dominant position in the carbonated soft 
drink market to the juice market.311  
2011 China 
Telecom/ 
China 
Unicom 
In November 2011, NDRC announced its 
investigation into China Telecom and China 
Unicom, alleging that they had conducted 
price discrimination by charging their rival 
ISPs much higher prices than those small 
ISPs not competing with them. A few weeks 
later, both SOEs proposed a number of 
rectifications and requested suspension of the 
investigation. The NDRC acknowledged the 
receipt of the proposal and no fine was 
imposed.312 
2013 White 
Liquor Case 
The Guizhou Price Bureau held that 
Kweichow Moutai had conducted RPM in 
violation of Art. 14 of the AML. Kweichow 
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313.  Wuliangye Gongsi Shishi Jiage Longduan Bei Chufa 2.02 Yiyuan [Wuliangye 
Conducted Price Monopoly and Was Fined RMB202 Million], SICHUAN DEV. AND REFORM 
COMM’N (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.scdrc.gov.cn/dir25/159074.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QM3V-3P2C] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) (China); Guizhousheng Wujia Ju 
[Guizhou Provincial Price Bureau], Guizhou Wujia Ju Guanyu Maotai Fanlongduan de Chufa 
Gonggao [Guizhou Price Bureau’s Announcement Regarding the Maotai Case Antitrust 
Punishment], WANGYI CAIJING [NETEASE FIN.] (Feb. 22, 2013), http://money.163.com/
13/0222/16/8OB59OO800252G50.html [https://perma.cc/MR2R-LVBB] (last visited Jan. 4, 
2018). 
314. Heshengyuan Deng Rufen Shengchan Qiye Weifan Fanlongduan Fa Xianzhi 
Jingzheng Xingwei Gongbei Chufa 6.6873 Yiyuan [Biostime and Other Milk Powder 
Companies Were Fined RMB 668.73 Million for Anti-Competitive Conduct and the Violation 
of the AML], NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
xwzx/xwfb/201308/t20130807_552991.html (China). 
Moutai was fined RMB 247 million, or 1 
percent of the “related” sales revenue in the 
previous year. The Sichuan Development 
and Reform Commission similarly fined 
Wuliangye RMB 202 million, or one percent 
of the “related” sales revenue in the previous 
year.313  
2013 Infant 
Formula 
Case 
The nine milk powder companies were 
accused of fixing resale prices for 
distributors and retailers in violation of 
Article 14 of the AML. NDRC fined six of 
these producers a total of RMB 668.7 
million, ranging from three percent to six 
percent of prior year’s revenue.314 
 
2014-
2015 
Auto Part 
Cases 
The Hubei Price Bureau announced that 
FAW-Volkswagen had conducted RPM with 
its dealerships. The Bureau fined FAW-
Volkswagen RMB 248.58 million. It also 
fined eight Audi dealerships RMB twenty 
nine million. 
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The Shanghai Price Bureau announced that 
Chrysler had conducted RPM with its dealers 
and fined Chrysler RMB 31.68 million. 
The Jiangsu Price Bureau announced that 
Mercedes-Benz had conducted RPM with its 
dealers and fined the company RMB 350 
million. 
The Hubei Price Bureau announced that four 
BMW dealerships had been involved in RPM 
practices. The bureau fined the dealerships a 
collective total of RMB 1.63 million. 
Guangdong DRC announced that Dongfeng-
Nissan had conducted RPM practices and 
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Jiage Longduan Beifa 2.4 Yi [FAW-Volkswagan Was Fined RMB 240 Million for Antitrust 
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Shu (Kelaisile Zhongguo Qiche Xiaoshou Youxian Gongsi) [Decision Regarding The Penalty 
of Chrysler], SHANGHAI MUN. DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N (Aug. 18, 2014), 
http://www.shdrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jggl/jghzcfjds/24064.htm [https://perma.cc/5N8Q-DHQY] 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2018); Li Jianping, Hubei Sijia Baoma Qiche Xiaoshou Shang Shexian 
Jiage Longduan Beifa 162wan [Four Dealers of BMW In Hubei Were Fined RMB1.62 Million 
For Price Monopolies], PHOENIX NEW MEDIA (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140813/41565291_0.shtml; Jiangsu Sheng Wujia ju [Jiangsu Price 
Bureau], Jiangsusheng Wujiaju Dui Benchi Gongsi Jiage Longduan An Zuochu Xingzheng 
Chufa [Jiangsu Price Bureau Made Decisions Regarding The Penalty of Mercedes-Benz For 
Price Monopolies], CHINA JIANGSU NETWORK (April 23, 2015), http://
jsnews2.jschina.com.cn/system/2015/05/21/024806045.shtml [https://perma.cc/92XB-B2ZH] 
(archived on Jan. 4, 2018); Guangdong Fagaiwei Dui Dongfeng Richan Kaichu 1.2 yiyuan 
Longduan Fadan [Dongfeng-Nissan Was Fined 120 Million by Guangdong NDRC for Anti-
Competitive Practices], NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N (Sept. 10, 2015), http://
fgs.ndrc.gov.cn/xtjl/201509/t20150925_752485.html [https://perma.cc/8RFW-5U5Y] (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2018) (China).  
316. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Fazhan He Gaiga Weiyuanhui Xingzheng 
Chufa Juedingshu [NDRC’s Decision Regarding the Penalty of The Violation of the AML], 
NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/
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fined Dongfeng-Nissan RMB 123 million. It 
also fined seventeen dealerships a total of 
RMB nineteen million.315 
2015 Qualcomm The NDRC found that Qualcomm abused its 
dominant market position in the licensing of 
standard essential patents concerning 
wireless telecommunication and baseband 
chip technologies. It imposed a number of 
behavioral remedies on Qualcomm and a fine 
of RMB 6,088 million, or eight percent of its 
sales revenue in 2013.316 
